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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
NOTE
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON DIVORCE BY THIRD PARTIES
The contrary results recently reached by two New York courts in
cases involving substantially the same set of facts focus attention again
on the problem of the validity of divorces obtained in States such as
Nevada and Florida. In each case, the plaintiff sought to annul her
existing marriage by attacking collaterally the earlier divorce of her
spouse. The attack was based on the foreign court's lack of jurisdiction
because of the invalid domicil of the earlier suit's party-plaintiff. How-
ever, in each case, the foreign court had found a valid domicil; and,
furthermore, the non-domiciled party (defendant in the present ac-
tion) had appeared and defended.
The court deciding the case of deMarigny v. deMarignyl allowed
the collateral attack, on the basis of recent leading cases. 2 The court
quoted from the second Williams case 3 that "those not parties to a
litigation ought not to be foreclosed by the interested actions of
others."
However, the case of Bane v. Bane4 refused to permit the collateral
attack on the foreign divorce decree, on the questionable ground that
it must be accorded full faith and credit.5 This decision was based on
three assumptions: first, that divorce jurisdiction is quasi in rem and,
181 N. Y. S. (2d) 228 (1948), Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County,
Part III.
2Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 92 L. ed. 1429 (1948), noted
(1948) 6 Wash and Lee L. Rev. 61; Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378, 68 S. Ct. 1094, 92 L.
ed. 1451 (1948); Matter of Lindgren's Estate, 293 N. Y. 18, 55 N. E. (2d) 849, 153
A. L. R. 936 (1944). The holding in the Coe case was substantially as follows:
"Where, after Massachusetts decree for separate support, husband instituted action
for divorce in Nevada wherein wife appeared and filed a cross-complaint for di-
vorce and Nevada court found that it had jurisdiction or parties and subject matter
and granted wife divorce and alimony, divorce decree was not subject to collateral
attack by former wife in Massachusetts, and attempted redetermination of juris-
diction of Nevada court by Massachusetts courts was void as a denial of full faith
and credit to Nevada divorce decree." (Headnote, 69 S. Ct. 1o94). The Sherrer case
was similar in all essentials to the Coe case. In the Lindgren case, a child was al-
lowed collaterally to attack the foreign divorce of its parents even though the non-
domiciled parent procured an order purporting to amend, nunc pro tunc, the
foreign divorce decree to include a recital of his appearance.
3Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 23o, 65 S. Ct. 1092, o95, 89 L. ed.
1577, 157 A. L. R. 1366 (1945).
'8o N. Y. S. (2d) 641 (1948), Supreme Court, Trial Term, New York County,
Part VII.
5U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 1.
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as such, is binding in certain instances on the whole world;0 second,
that one of these instances is (by virtue of various decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, including the Sherrer and Coe
caseS7 principally, but also both the Williams cases,8 as well as several
New York decisions9) when both parties are before the court rendering
the decree; and, third, that public policy demands the recognition of
a divorce decree regularly procured.1
Regardless of the historical view that divorce is an in rem action,"
the recent Williams cases12 clearly indicate an intent on the part of the
"Jurisdiction in divorce matters is clearly based upon something more than
personal jurisdiction over the parties to the suit. The prerequisite of a domicile
within the state indicates a requirement that the marital res be present and that
a decree of divorce operates at least quasi in rem." 8o N. Y. S. (2d) 641, 646. "The rule
is otherwise [distinguished from a judgment in personam] with reference to a judg-
ment in rem which, it has been said, is binding upon the world when the court
which purports to act has jurisdiction over the res involved." 8o N. Y. S. (2d) 641,
645 (1948).
7See note 2, supra.
sWilliams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. 279, 143
A. L. R. 1273 (1942); 325 U. S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. ed. 1577, 157 A. L. R. 1366
(1945). In the Williams cases, a State was prosecuting the defendants on the grounds
that their remarriage following foreign divorce decrees, obtained in ex parte pro-
ceedings, amounted to bigamous cohabitation. In the first Williams case, the State
did not attack the domicil established by the plaintiffs in the divorce suits but
instead relied on the holding in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525,
5o L. ed. 867 (19o6), to the effect that: "...mere domicil within the state of one
party to the marriage does not give the courts of that state jurisdiction to render
a decree of divorce enforceable in all other states by virtue of the full faith and
credit clause...." (headnote, 26 S. Ct. 525). The Supreme Court overruled the
Haddock case and held that the foreign divorce decree must be accorded full faith
and credit because the domiciliary finding of the foreign court had not been as-
sailed and no allegation of denial of due process had been made. However, in the
second Williams case, the State was allowed to attack the foreign divorce decree
collaterally by finding it was based on an invalid domicil, and the conviction of the
defendants was affirmed.
OBane v. Bane, 8o N. Y. S. (2d) 641, 648 (1948) cites the following cases: Kinnier
v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 535, 6 Am. Rep. 132 (1871); Rugel v. Heckel et al, 85 N. Y. 483
(1881); Tiedemann v. Tiedemann, 172 App. Div. 819, 158 N. Y. Supp. 851 (gi6),
aff'd 225 N. Y. 709, 122 N. E. 892 (919); Frost v. Frost, 26a App. Div. 694, 23 N. Y. S.
(2d) 753 (1940); Senor v. Senor, 272 App. Div. 3o6, 70 N. Y. S. (2d) 909 (1947), aff'd
297 N. Y. 8oo, 78 N. E. (2d) o (1948).
""The combinations and permutations of inconsistencies in matrimonial status
resulting from a decision contrary to the one here made would be endless, unsavory
litigation brewed interminably, and the heartbreak and suffering of literally thous-
ands of persons would be incalculable." Bane v. Bane, 8o N. Y. S. (ad) 641, 652 (1948).
"For a discussion of the complex situation which must necessarily arise if di-
vorce is treated as a proceeding in rem, and a demonstration of the inconclusiveness
of such a procedure see Haddock v. Haddock, aoi U. S. 562, 576-578, 26 S. Ct. 525,
530-531, 5o L. ed. 867, 872-873 (1906).
"See note 8, supra.
1949]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court to avoid this easy but inflexible attitude. In the first
Williams case, the Court said:
"We... agree that it does not aid in the solution of the prob-
lem presented by this case to label these proceedings as pro-
ceedings in rem. Such a suit, however, is not a mere in personam
action."
1 3
The Court continues and indicates what is meant by, and what is the
reason for, referring to divorce as something more than an in per-
sonam action:
"Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern
in the marital status of persons domiciled within its borders.
... Thus it is plain that each state by virtue of its command over
its domiciliaries... can alter within its own borders the mar-
riage status of the spouse domiciled there, even though the
other spouse is absent."
14
The second Williams case also refused to label a divorce action as
in rem, and also says:
"But insofar as a divorce decree partakes of some of the char-
acteristics of a decree in rem, it is misleading to say that all the
world is a party to a proceeding in rem .... All the world is
not a party to a divorce proceeding."' 15
The Court immediately continues, throwing further light on the con-
cept that divorce jurisdiction is not merely in personam, and indicating
conclusively that under some conditions, at least, a foreign decree may
be collaterally attacked.
"What is true is that all the world need not be present before a
court granting the decree and yet it must be respected by the
other forty-seven States provided-and it is a big proviso-the
conditions for the exercise of power by the divorce-decreeing
court are validly established whenever that judgment is else-
where called into question. In short, the decree of divorce is
a conclusive adjudication of everything except the jurisdiction-
al facts upon which it is founded, and domicil is a jurisdictional
fact. To permit the necessary finding of domicil by one State to
foreclose all States in the protection of their social institutions
would be intolerable."'1
1317 U. S. 287, 297, 63 S. Ct. 207, 212-213, 87 L. ed. 279, 285 (1942).
1'317 U. S. 287, 298-299, 63 S. Ct. 207, 213, 87 L. ed. 279, 286 (1942). [italics sup-
plied]
"325 U. S. 226, 232, 65 S. Ct. 1o92, io96, 89 L. ed. 1577, 1583 (1945).




An examination of the Sherrer decisiori17 will disclose that it consti-
tutes no authority for the proposition that divorce jurisdiction should
be treated as in rem, because that concept is not even mentioned in
the case; and, furthermore, such an examination impels the conclusion
that it cannot necessarily be said on the basis of this case that a di-
vorce is binding on the whole world merely because both parties were
before the court.
In the Sherrer case, as in the two recent New York cases, both par-
ties to the divorce action were before the foreign court, but in the
Sherrer case the party defendant in the earlier adjudication was at-
tacking collaterally the foreign divorce decree, whereas in the New
York cases a person not a party to the earlier action was doing so. The
importance of this distinction becomes apparent when it is noted that
the principle of res judicata-which, as an elementary matter, binds
only the parties to a suit-as applied in the case of Baldwin v. Iowa
State Traveling Men's Association, 8 was brought into the. Sherrer
case through the case of Davis v. Davis.'9 The Court said:
"We believe that the decision of this Court in the Davis case
and those in related situations ... are clearly indicative of the
result to be reached here. Those cases stand for the proposition
that the requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant
from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional
grounds in the courts of a sister State where there has been par-
ticipation by the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where
the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest
the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not suscep-
tible to such collateral attack in the courts of the State which
rendered the decree."
20
It would appear to be an unwarranted extension of the res judicata
17See note 2, supra.
a83 U. S. 522, 51 S. Ct. 517, 75 L. ed. 1244 (1931). The case concerned reliti-
gation of an issue in a Federal court when it had previously been settled, with de-
fendant contesting this issue, in another Federal court.
"305 U. S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3, 83 L. ed. 26 (1938). Here the wife was not allowed
to relitigate in a Federal court the issue of domicil of her husband when it had
been previously settled in a divorce action in a State court, where the wife had ap-
peared in the State court and had contested the domicil issue. The Court said:
"She may not say that he was not entitled to sue for divorce in the State court,
for she appeared there and by plea put in issue his allegation as to domicil ....
Plainly the determination of the decree upon that point is effective for all pur-
poses in this litigation." 3o5 U. S. 32, 40, 59 S. Ct. 3, 6, 83 L. ed. 26, 29-30 (1938).
The Court then cited the Baldwin case, see note 18, supra.
"Sherrer v. Sherrer, 384 U. S. 343, 351-352, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 1091, 92 L. ed. 1429,
1436 (1948). [italics supplied].
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doctrine to treat as controlling, in a case where parties are not the
same, a decision which was ultimately based on that doctrine.
This perusal of the recent decisions indicates that when the Su-
preme Court refers to divorce as being something more than a mere
in personam action, such reference, so far as the decided cases affirma-
tively show, means nothing more than that where a divorce decree is
founded on a valid domicil, it-as distinguished from an in personam
judgment-is valid under the full faith and credit clause anywhere in
the United States, even though the court did not have jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant. But, any labeling of divorce as in the na-
ture of an in rem action results in confusion, and literally begs the
question. The question in such controversies as the recent New York
cases would seem to be: What is necessary for a State to have such con-
trol of a divorce case that even the jurisdictional facts may not be col-
laterally attacked by an interested third party? To say that when both
parties are before the State court, it controls the "marital res" and thus
binds the whole world, assumes that there is such a thing as a "marital
res," as well as that the mere presence of both parties places that res
before the court. The Sherrer case justifies no such assumptions; in-
stead it simply prevents, by indirectly applying the doctrine of res
judicata, a defendant who appears in a foreign divorce action from
later collaterally attacking the divorce decree, regardless of whether the
judgment is considered as in rem or in personam or something else.
The same would be true in regard to an ordinary in personam judg-
ment.2 1 In view of the lack of usefulness, so far as the Bane and de-
Marigny cases are concerned, in calling divorce an in rem action, and
in view of the Supreme Court's reluctance to label it as such, it would
seem more in keeping with reality to treat divorce jurisdiction as sui
generis, a thing apart.
If divorce jurisdiction is regarded as sui generis, the foregoing cases
have indicated the test, or guide, that the Supreme Court would use
to answer the question presented in the Bane and deMarigny cases.
The fundamental basis for such a test or guide is indicated by the at-
titude and ultimate intentions displayed by the Supreme Court in the
second Williams case, in which a State in a criminal action was allowed
to make a collateral attack upon the finding of domicil behind a
foreign divorce decree, where the non-domiliced party did not appear,
and thus did not defend the State's own interests and institutions. The
Court said:
"To permit the necessary findings of domicil by one State to
'See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
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foreclose all States in the protection of their social institutions
would be intolerable.
"But to endow each State with controlling authority to nul-
lify the power of a sister State to grant a divorce based upon a
finding that one spouse had acquired a new domicil within the
divorcing State would, in the proper functioning of our federal
system, be equally indefensible. No State court can assume com-
prehensive attention to the various and potentially conflicting
interests that several States may have in the institutional aspects
of marriage. The necessary accommodation between the right
of one State to safeguard its interest in the family relation of
its own people and the power of another State to grant divorces
can be left to neither State."
22
The Court then announced its own role. The States were to be left
their divorce and probate jurisdiction, 23 while the Supreme Court
was merely to reconcile the full faith and credit clause with the acknow-
ledged principle that "the domestic relations of husband and wife
and parent and child were matters [to be] reserved to the States .... -24
To give effect to the foregoing fundamental aims, the test as to ap-
plication of the full faith and credit clause appears, on the basis of
the statements from the Williams cases quoted near the outset of this
discussion, to be whether or not there is a valid domicil behind the
decree. A valid domicil entitles a decree of divorce to full faith and
credit; but a decree rendered on an invalid domicil is a mere usurpa-
tion of jurisdiction. In event of such usurpation, the true State of domi-
cil may either directly, in its own name, or indirectly, in the name of
an interested person coming into its courts, assert, and is expected to
assert, its acknowledged power to control its domiciliaries. No State
or interested person is intended to be disarmed, through use of the
full faith and credit clause, of all protection against the effects of a di-
vorce decree entered on an invalid domicil. That a party submitting
himself to the foreign court's jurisdiction, as in the Sherrer case, will
be prevented, basically by the doctrine of res .judicata, from collateral-
ly attacking the decree, is scarcely authority for the proposition that
a State or other interested party cannot do so. Even the Sherrer case
-2325 U. S. 226, 232, 65 S. Ct. 1092, io96, 89 L. ed. 1577, 1583 (1945). (italics sup-
plied].
2Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 233, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 1097, 89 L. ed.
1577, 1583 (1945): "But the discharge of this duty does not make of this court a
court of probate and divorce."
2"State of Ohio ex rel Popovici v. Agler, 28o U. S. 379, 384, 50 S. Ct. 154, 155, 74
L. ed 489, 498 (1930), cited in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 233, 65 S.
Ct. 1092, io96, 89 L. ed. 1577, 1583 (1945).
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recognizes "the importance of a State's power to determine the incidents
of basic social relationships into which its domiciliaries enter."25
This power was recognized and availed of by the New York court
in Matter of Lindgren's Estate,26 in which the importance of the power
was demonstrated. Under the facts very similar to the main cases, a
child was allowed to attack collaterally the foreign divorce decree of
its parents, thus determining certain property rights. Furthermore,
the same court in Swanston v. Swanston27 exerted this power to as-
certain whether a prior foreign divorce of petitioner's wife was valid,
thus settling petitioner's status, even though petitioner's wife had ap-
peared in the earlier action. Adopting and applying a principle an-
nounced in the case of Senor v. Senor,28 the court said:
"Where persons having no complicity in the divorce proceed-
ings have legitimate interests in a determination of the validity
of the divorce, they may arouse the state's interest and institu-
tute an inquiry, which our courts will entertain, to ascertain
the validity of a divorce decree by a foreign state as to persons
alleged to have been at the time residents of this State."2 9
Thus, at least some of the New York courts have recognized the in-
terest that a third party may have in the validity or invalidity of a di-
vorce decree affecting other parties as principals. It would appear that
under facts similar to those of the Bane and deMarigny cases, the New
2334 U. S. 343, 354, 68 S. Ct. 1087, 1092, 92 L. ed. 1429, 1438 (1948).
2'See note 2, supra. See also Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272 App. Div. 6o, 69 N. Y. S.
(2d) 57 (1947): "A child conceived after his mother had obtained a divorce from
his alleged father in Arkansas was not precluded from attacking validity of the di-
vorce decree on ground that Arkansas court did not have jurisdiction to enter de-
cree because neither of parties was domiciled therein, for purpose of establishing
that he was a legitimate son, even though the decree would have been binding on
the parties themselves." [headnote, 69 N. Y. S. (2d) 57]. In the opinion the court
said: "The federal Constitution does not compel recognition of judgments that
would not have been rendered in other states unless the parties had stipulated,
in effect, that the court of the other state had jurisdiction of the subject matter
which it did not possess." 272 App. Div. 6o, 69 N. Y. S. (2d) 57, 59 (947).
-76 N. Y. S. (2d) 175 (1947). In the opinion, it was pointed out that to allow
third parties to attack collaterally a foreign divorce decree, while disallowing such
attack by the principal parties therqselves where they had both appeared before the
foreign court, was "both logical and reasonable," and that the logic of such a
policy could be attacked only by arguing that a divorce decree acts in rem. The court
answered this argument by stressing the refusal of the Supreme Court to label
such a decree as in rem, and by repeating its statement in the second Williams case
that, "All the world is not a party to a divorce proceeding." (See note 15, supra).
2272 App. Div. 306, 312, 7o N. Y. S. (2d) 9o9, 913 (1947), noted (1948) 5 Wash.
and Lee L. Rev. 114.
2Swanston v. Swanston, 76 N. Y. S. (2d) 175, 176 (1947). See also Lane v. Lane,
188 Misc. 435, 68 N. Y. S. (zd) 712 (1947).
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York courts are allowed by the United States Supreme Court to pro-
tect the interests of its citizens-as for example, by verifying such citi-
zen's status-and are constrained by New York decisions to do so.
In the only similar case found in other jurisdictions, one distin-
guishing factor appeared which provided the court with a different
,approach to the problem of collateral attack. In Mussey v. Mussey3°
the facts substantially paralleled those of the main cases, in that a hus-
band sought to annul an existing marriage alleging that his wife's
foreign divorce from a former husband was invalidly rendered because
of lack of domicil of either of the parties. The earlier divorce had been
obtained in Nevada, and both parties had been before the Nevada
court. However, in the Mussey case it was shown in evidence, and ac-
cepted as proved, that the second husband, the party now seeking the
annulment, had been the principal movant in the Nevada divorce pro-
ceeding. The court said:
"In the second place,31 complainant is estopped to deny the
validity of the Nevada decree, even though it was fraudulently
obtained .... Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions,
this Court is committed to the proposition that one in privity
with a person who by fraudulent conduct procures a divorce
decree is estopped to question its validity.
'5 2
While it does not appear in the opinions of the New York cases
whether this factor was there involved, it is common knowledge that
many divorces are obtained with the intention of remarrying immedi-
ately, and that the prospective spouse often has an active part in
prosecuting the divorce proceedings. The courts should be alerted
against the possibility of this second spouse's later asserting the rights
of a "third person" to attack the validity of the divorce to which he
was not a technical "party." The possibility of such an unjustifiable
pose of third party status being advanced, however, should not pre-
vent the courts from extending protection to the interests of bona
fide strangers to the previous action.
BENJAMIN L. WssoN
37 Div. 943, 37 S. (2d) 921 (Ala. 1948). This is one of the very few cases sub-
stantially similar to the Bane and deMarigny cases arising outside the State of
New York, since the decision in the Sherrer and Coe cases.
"I The court placed the decision on alternative grounds, the first being that,
... the Nevada decree ... is res adjudicata between the parties, and under the
full faith and credit clause... must be respected in this State." No further discus-
sion was attempted by the court on this ground. Mussey v. Mussey, 7 Div. 943, 37 S.
(2d) 921, 922 (Ala. 1948).
07 Div. 943, 37 S. (2d) 91-1, 922 (Ala. 1948).
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